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"War made the state, and the state made war."
- Charles Tilly'
INTRODUCTION
The history of the European nation-state, wrote political sociologist Charles
Tilly, is inextricably bound up with the history of warfare. To oversimplify Tilly's
nuanced and complex arguments, the story goes something like this: as power-
holders (originally bandits and local strongmen) sought to expand their power,
they needed capital to pay for weapons, soldiers, and supplies. The need for cap-
ital and new recruits drove the creation of taxation systems and census mecha-
nisms, and the need for more effective systems of taxation and recruitment ne-
cessitated better roads, better communications, and better record keeping. This
in turn enabled the creation of larger and more technologically sophisticated ar-
mies.
The complexity and expense of maintaining more professionalized standing
armies made it increasingly difficult for non-state groups to compete with states,
giving centralized states a war-making advantage and enabling them to increas-
ingly monopolize the means of large-scale violence. But the need to recruit, train,
and sustain ever-larger and more sophisticated armies also put pressure on these
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1. Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State Making, in THE
FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 3,42 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
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states to provide basic services, improve nutrition, education, and so on. Ulti-
mately, we arrive at the late twentieth-century European welfare state, with its
particular trade-offs between the state and its subjects.'
By now, Tilly's claim that "war made the state, and the state made war" is so
widely accepted that it has become almost a truism-so much so that we're apt
to forget that the process of war-making and state transformation is ongoing, and
not merely a matter for the history books. Today, as in the past, the state makes
war-and though there is nothing deterministic or teleological about it, the man-
ner in which the state makes war drives further changes both in the shape of the
state itself and in its relationship with individuals.
The state makes war in several different senses. Most obviously, it is the state
that wages war: the state chooses which wars to fight, and how to fight them. In
2001, for instance, the United States decided to go to war in Afghanistan, first
relying largely on air power in conjunction with small numbers of Army Special
Forces troops and CIA paramilitary personnel, then expanding the military effort
until, by 2olo, the U.S. force in Afghanistan consisted of roughly ioo,ooo troops.'
Similarly, in 2003 the United States chose to invade Iraq, launching an eight-year
war; by 2007, United States troop levels in Iraq peaked at nearly 170,000. These
"traditional" forms of state war-making have institutional and budgetary impli-
cations and opportunity costs, and though their long-term impact remains un-
knowable, they appear to fit into Tilly's paradigm in relatively straightforward
ways.'
2. See id.; see also CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 900-
1992 (1990); Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in
BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 169 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1985).
3. Paul Waldman, The 13-Year War, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 18, 2013), http://prospect
.org/article/13-year-war.
4. Chart: U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq, CNN (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/
2011/10/21/world/meast/chart-us-troops-iraq/index.html. Overall, some two and a
half million U.S. military personnel had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan by 2013.
Chris Adams, Millions Went to War in Iraq, Afghanistan, Leaving Many with Lifelong
Scars, MCCLATCHY DC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2o13/
03/14/85880/millions-went-to-war-in-iraq-afghanistan.html.
5. One might argue, for instance, that the sheer cost of these two wars contributed to
a spike in U.S. debt, increasing U.S. vulnerability to financial crisis and U.S. reliance
on foreign creditors such as China. See, e.g., Linda Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of
Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future Na-
tional Security Budgets (Harvard Univ., Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Faculty Working
Paper Series RWP 13-oo6, 2013), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publica-
tions/workingpapers/citation.aspx?Publd=8956; Max Fisher, This Surprising Chart
Shows Which Countries Own the Most U.S. Debt, WASH. POST (Oct.
10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2o13/10/lo/this
-surprising-chart-shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/. The military,
under strain due to frequent combat deployments, pushed for and received sub-
stantial increases in compensation and benefits for service members and their de-




But the state "makes" war in other senses as well. From an institutional per-
spective, it is the state that decides which tasks to assign to civilian entities and
which tasks to assign to the military (which we are apt to define, more or less
tautologically, as that specialized state institution designated as having responsi-
bility for the activity we call warfare). From a legal perspective, it is the state that
chooses which activities will be categorized as "war" and war-related, thus deter-
mining the legal framework within which both individual rights and subsequent
state uses of coercion and lethal force are evaluated.
The United States' response to 9/11 is a case in point. The 9/11 attacks might
have been viewed as egregious acts of criminality, for instance, or as an armed
attack of sufficient gravity to trigger an international-law right to use force in self-
defense, without triggering an armed conflict.' The United States opted instead
to treat the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. response as an armed conflict.'
This had legal consequences: once the United States categorized the post-
9/11 relationship between the United States and Al Qaeda-and, later, between
the United States and Al Qaeda's "associates"-as "war," a large swath of state
and non-state activities were brought within the ambit of the international law
of armed conflict, with its far more permissive rules for the state use of lethal
benefits, potentially reshaping the nature of federal employment and shifting the
civil-military balance. See Analysis of Federal Civilian and Military Compensation,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
120xx/docI2042/01-20-compensation.pdf. At the same time, the greatly increased
U.S. reliance on private military contractors in these two wars helped fuel a vast
expansion of private military and security companies, further blurring the already
blurry boundaries between public and private. See, e.g., Shantanu Chakrabarti,
Growth and Implications of Private Military Corporations, 2 J. DEF. STUDS. 109
(2008); see LAURA DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PROTECTING PUBLIC
VALUES IN AN ERA OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011).
6. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories
of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993 (2001); Matthew Jaffe & Jake Tapper,
Senate Republicans Block James Cole, Key Obama Nominee at Justice Dept., ABC
NEWS (May 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2o11/o5/senate
-republicans-block-james-cole-key-obama-nominee -at-justice-dept/; Alain Pellet,
No, This is Not War! The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, EUR. J.
INT'L L. DISCUSSION F. (Oct. 3, 2001), https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliog-
raphy/BiblioInternatLawPellet_2001.doc.
7. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1301 (2001), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-
17/html/WCPD-2001-09-17-Pg13ol-2.htm; William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed
Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2003). As I have
argued elsewhere, there was nothing inevitable or legally "necessary" about the U.S.
decision to treat its post-9/11 relationship with Al Qaeda as an armed conflict for
legal purposes. The Bush Administration could have opted to view the conflict
through a different lens, but preferred not to, with far-reaching consequences. See
Rosa Brooks, Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy in the War on Terror,
26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
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force and its far weaker protections for individual rights. The existence of a "war"
on terrorism also had enormous consequences for domestic law. Historically,
lawmakers have offered the executive branch far greater powers, and judges have
afforded it far greater deference during wartime than during peacetime. The
post-9/n1 war on terrorism continued that trend.'
Since 9/11, the United States has continued to "make" war by placing more
and more activities into the "war" category. Consider cyber security. As with ter-
rorism, the United States had a choice. It might have decided, for example, that
cyber security should be the sole province of the private sector or civilian agencies
and that cyber attacks should be treated only as torts or crimes. Instead, it opted
to create a military Cyber Command and recruit "cyber warriors," in addition to
giving some cyber security responsibilities to civilian agencies.9 It also chose to
treat cyber attacks as potentially constituting acts of war, subject to the laws of
war.
Though it takes us farther from Tilly's original paradigm,"o this kind of state
war-making can transform the state as much as the more traditional forms of
state war-making." In the United States, for instance, the perceived need to mon-
itor and act upon a far-flung global network of loosely affiliated non-state actors
with which we are "at war" has driven state investment in new technologies de-
signed to enable global surveillance and the cross-border use of lethal force.
While it is too soon to say how this story will evolve, the increased use of these
new capabilities is beginning to change the United States' relationship with other
states and to further erode traditional conceptions of sovereignty.
New forms of state war-making also have significant implications for the re-
lationship between individuals and the state. Some of these implications are rel-
atively obvious. Indeed, after 9/11, human rights advocates and civil libertarians
were quick to point out the ways in which laws and policies purportedly necessary
to the "war on terror" increased state power at the expense of transparency, ac-
countability, and individual rights. The indefinite detention of alleged terrorists
as "enemy combatants" seemed at odds with due process norms, for instance,
while the use of "enhanced" interrogation methods against terror suspects at
times amounted to torture. More recently, media and advocacy attention has fo-
8. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004).
9. Cheryl Pellerin, Cybercom Builds Teams for Offense, Defense in Cyberspace, U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF.: AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119506.
10. Tilly's paradigm was, in any case, historical in nature, developed to explicate the
rise of the European nation-state rather than to suggest an eternal and unvarying
relationship between war-making and state expansion.
11. See generally PHILIP BOBBITr, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008) (noting the numerous
implications of the shift from wars between nation-states to wars between states




cused on National Security Agency monitoring of telephone and Internet com-
munications and on drone strikes and other cross-border targeted killings of ter-
ror suspects in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
Most of these post-9/11 state activities have been authorized by Congress or
have been largely upheld-or at least tolerated-by U.S. courts." After 9/11, the
USA PATRIOT Act and similar legislation greatly enhanced the state's domestic
search-and-seizure powers in national-security-related cases, for instance."
Meanwhile, the Justice Department's invocation of the state secrets doctrine
made it difficult for litigants to challenge state actions undertaken in the name of
national security, and courts have relied on other judicially created doctrines to
avoid ruling on the merits in most other cases challenging government activities
arising out of the war on terror. Indeed, as Stephen Vladeck notes, "not a single
damages judgment has been awarded in any of the dozens of lawsuits arising out
of post-September ii U.S. counterterrorism policies alleging violations of plain-
tiffs individual rights." 4
The apparent erosion of individual rights stemming from the expansion of
what the United States treats as "war" or war-related has been amply docu-
mented." My purpose in this Essay is not to add to that already vast literature,
but rather to draw attention to some of the still more subtle ways in which U.S.
practices and legal doctrines developed after 9/11 for "war-making" purposes may
be altering the balance of power between individuals and the state.
Specifically, my goal in this short Essay is to draw attention to the slow trick-
ling down of war-related legal doctrines and practices into "ordinary" law and
law enforcement. This trickle-down effect is diffuse and difficult to discern-in
many cases, its existence remains largely speculative." But this makes efforts to
12. The Supreme Court did impose some limits on early Bush Administration deten-
tion-related policies and efforts to remove detainees from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (20o8); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004). Similarly, Congress sought to rein in the United States's use of interro-
gation techniques amounting to torture. For the most part, however, Congress and
the courts have acquiesced in the executive branch's post-9/11 policies. Even with
regard to claims of torture, federal courts have found numerous reasons to prevent
lawsuits seeking damages for torture from going forward. See Developments in the
Law-Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2009) (noting that none of the
cases seeking damages for alleged U.S. torture have survived summary judgment).
13. See What is the USA PATRIOT Act?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 1o, 2010),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/surveillance-under-usa-patriot-act.
14. Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296
(2012).
15. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING
THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); see also SUSAN G. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE
WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012).
16. Indeed, the existence of such trickle-down effects is inherently hard to prove: dis-
entangling correlation and causation is particularly difficult, and the secrecy
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document it all the more important, lest the very diffuseness and invisibility of
the trickle-down effects blind us to the ongoing and profound transformation of
relations between individuals and the state.
I am by no means the first commentator to note the potentially distorting
effect of national-security practices and doctrines on seemingly unrelated areas
of law and law enforcement. In September 2002, the Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights (now renamed Human Rights First) published a report called A Year
of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since September i." This report-and a fol-
low-up report published a year later' 8 -looked at the impact of post-9/ni law and
policy on such areas as general government transparency, the right to privacy, the
treatment of immigrants, refugees and minorities, and the criminal justice sys-
tem.
More recently, legal scholars have looked at the rising use of classified evi-
dence in criminal cases; the increased invocation of the state secrets doctrine in
ordinary tort and contract litigation; the spillover of national-security related
changes to qualified immunity doctrines into other areas of law; the impact of
post-9/i changes on immigration law and policy; and the importation of military
and counterterrorism tactics into domestic policing, among other issues. Rela-
tively few commentators, however, have sought to address the spillover of war
and counterterrorism practices and legal doctrines into "ordinary" law and law
enforcement as a distinct crosscutting problem. 9 And to my knowledge, no one
has yet sought to comprehensively assess the nature and extent of this spillover,
looking across multiple areas of civil and criminal law and law enforcement. 20
shrouding some government activities-and even government legal arguments-
makes matters all the worse.
17. Fiona Doherty et al., A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since September n1,
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2002), https://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/loss-report.pdf.
18. Fiona Doherty et al., Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy Since
9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(2003), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/powers.pdf.
19. Stephen Vladeck is a notable exception. See Vladeck, supra note 14; see also Stephen
Viadeck, Is "National Security Law" Inherently Paradoxical?, i AM. U. NAT'L
SECURITY L. BRIEF 11 (2011); Stephen I. Viadeck, Foreword: National Security's Dis-
tortion Effects, 32 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 285 (2010).
20. Although little has been done to comprehensively map the trickle-down effects of
the war on terror, a great deal has been written on the broad dangers posed by the
normalization of emergency powers. See THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND
ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v.
Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOzO L.
REV. 2005 (20o6); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004); Oren Gross, Chaos
and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.




This Essay does not seek to offer such a comprehensive assessment. Instead,
it seeks to develop a preliminary and partial map of the trickle-down war, high-
lighting several areas in which there appear to be clear indications of a trickle-
down effect. This Essay also notes a number of areas in which the existence of
current or future trickle-down effects seem probable, but where the evidence is
inconclusive.
A major caveat is necessary here: it is extraordinarily difficult to "prove"
trickle-down." Trickle-down effects are generally gradual and subtle, rather than
sudden and dramatic, making them inherently difficult to identify and measure.
And it is more difficult still to determine the causes, rather than merely the corre-
lates, of such gradual and subtle changes. My goal here is therefore not to reach
definitive conclusions, but rather to outline a broader research agenda, in hopes
that others will take up the challenge of comprehensively assessing the extent of
the trickle-down war.
To that end, this Essay focuses on several areas in which war's trickle-down
effects may exist: domestic policing, the use of the state secrets doctrine, the use
of classified evidence in criminal cases, immigration policy, First Amendment ju-
risprudence, privacy, and surveillance. I also identify a number of other areas for
further exploration.
I. POLICING
The trickle-down effects of America's post-9/11 wars are perhaps most out-
wardly visible in domestic policing. In general, American policing has become far
more militarized over the last few decades. 2 The trend towards increased milita-
rization predates 9/11, but accelerated substantially after the attacks. Consider the
use of police SWAT teams, with their paramilitary tactics and equipment. The
first police SWAT teams were created after the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles;"
initially, they were used primarily for emergencies such as hostage situations and
Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1825 (2000); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent
Emergency, 4o GA. L. REV. 699, 718-19 (2006); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1408 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a
Time ofEmergency: States ofException and the Temptations of9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. too (2004); see also MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (2012) (arguing that "war time" has never been as sharply deline-
ated as we often assume, and that far from being exceptional, various forms of war-
related actions have been the norm for the United States throughout the last cen-
tury). I see this Essay as a small contribution to that important literature.
21. This problem is exacerbated by government secrecy.
22. Abigail R. Hall & Christopher J. Coyne, The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing,
INDEP. REV., Spring 2013, at 485; see RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR Cop: THE
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA'S POLICE FORCES (2013).
23. BALKO, supra note 22, at 53.
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domestic terror threats. Over time, however, the number of SWAT teams ex-
panded. SWAT teams were increasingly used in routine policing-deployed to
execute search and arrest warrants in drug-related cases. Radley Balko estimates
that there were roughly 3000 SWAT raids nationwide in 1980; by 2006, the num-
ber of annual SWAT raids had jumped to 5o,ooo, and Balko believes that by 2012,
there were as many as 80,ooo SWAT raids per year."
The increased use of SWAT teams in ordinary policing has been paralleled
by a similar post-9/11 rise in police efforts to adopt other tactics developed by
foreign militaries and intelligence services for counterterrorism purposes, 5 the
proliferation of police academy programs modeled on military basic training,6
the increased use of military-style battle dress uniforms for police on the streets,27
and the growing use by police departments of weapons and other equipment de-
veloped for military purposes-from Humvees to surveillance drones." Many of
these weapons and equipment literally come direct from foreign war zones,
24. See Tim Gurrister, Why More SWAT-Style Raids? A 'Militarized' World, STANDARD-
EXAMINER, Aug. 10, 2013, http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/o3/23/why-more-
swat-style-raids-militarized-world; Sarah Stillman, SWAT-Team Nation, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2o13/
o8/swat-team-nation.html.
25. Consider stop-and-frisk programs. See, e.g., William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat:
How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the City?, NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/25/o50725fafact2; Patrice O'Shaugh-
nessy, NYPD Gathering Intel, on Lookoutfor Terrorists Around the World, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 6, 20o8, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/nypd-gathering-in-
tel-lookout-terrorists-world-article-.351616; Anya Sostek, Taking Action: New
York's State of Mind, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL'Y RESEARCH (Oct. 2004),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_govmag-out-of-the-twin-towers.
htm; David Reeder, NYPD's Elite E-Men: Ready to Counter Attack Terror, TACTICAL-
LIFE (July 2009), http://www.tactical-life.com/magazines/tactical-weapons/nypds-
elite-e-men/.
26. See Karl W. Bickel, Recruit Training: Are We Preparing Officers for a Community
Oriented Department?, CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (June 2013), http://cops.usdoj
.gov/html/dispatch/o6-2013/preparing-officers-for_a_communityoriented
department.asp.
27. See Karl W. Bickel, BDUs and Community Policing?, CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH
(Nov. 2012), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/11-2o2/bdus-community-polic-
ing.asp.
28. See Defense Department Gives Local Police Equipment Designed for a War Zone, Fox
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2o13/11/27/defense-department
-gives-local-police-equipment-designed-for-warzone/; John Hanrahan, Local Po-
lice Forces Are Now Little Armies. Why?, NIEMAN WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseation=askthis.view&askthisid=
529 ; Michael Shank & Elizabeth Beavers, The Militarization of U.S. Police Forces,





through a Defense Department program that donates unneeded military equip-
ment to police forces. 9 Homeland Security counterterrorism grants have also
fueled the police acquisition of tools more popularly associated with war.30
Increasingly, war and policing have begun to converge both in terms of tac-
tics and in terms of outward appearance. As John Parry has noted, "war has
changed in its functions, to become more like policing, [and] policing too has
changed, to become more like war.""1 On the covert battlefields of the war on
terror, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. war-making often superficially re-
sembles policing in that it involves individuals and small teams rather than the
large-scale armies associated with nineteenth- and twentieth-century warfare. Its
victories and defeats are defined in terms of the activities of individuals and or-
ganizations, rather than in terms of terrain held or surrendered. Meanwhile, as
U.S. police departments increasingly use military tactics, weapons, equipment
and even apparel, U.S. domestic policing has come to look more and more like
war.
II. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL CASES
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule permitting the
government to block the release of information in civil litigation if the infor-
mation would reveal secrets damaging to U.S. national security interests. The
privilege can be invoked by the government even in litigation between private
parties, and, while courts have the power to make an independent evaluation of
whether to accept government claims of state secrets, courts have generally de-
ferred to executive branch requests.32
Numerous commentators have decried the U.S. government's frequent in-
vocation of the state secrets privilege to prevent direct challenges to post-9/11 U.S.
government policies from moving forward in the courts. Laura Donohue has
29. See Michael Shank & Elizabeth Beavers, America's Police Are Looking More and More
Like the Military, GUARDIAN, Oct. 7, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2o13/oct/o7/militarization-local-police-america.
30. See Andrew Becker & G.W. Schulz, Local Cops Ready for War with Homeland Secu-
rity-Funded Military Weapons, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2o11/12/20/local-cops-ready-for-war-with-homeland
-security-funded-military-weapons.html.
31. John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
765, 768 (2007).
32. See TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41741, THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE: PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION (2011).
33. See, e.g., Erin E. Bohannon, Breaking the Silence: A Challenge to Executive Use of the
State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss Claims of CIA Torture in Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 621 (2010); Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and Self-
Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2012); ioo Days: End the Abuse of the State
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gone further examining the ways in which the state secrets doctrine has increas-
ingly been used by private litigants in areas far removed from war and national
security.34 Donohue examined docket records from the past thirty years and rec-
ords from the more than 1300 case holdings since 1790 that refer to state secrets,
supplementing this with an examination of "citations in pleadings, motions,
briefs, memorandum opinions, judicial decisions, Headnote strings, legislative
searches, and secondary source materials." 5 She found that, while the state se-
crets doctrine is generally regarded as an evidentiary rule within the broader ex-
ecutive privilege doctrine, it has recently come to be used in a far wider range of
ways.36
The expansive war on terror has led to increased entangling of the govern-
ment and the private sectors; the government has relied on private companies to
provide a range of support services; the government's desire to access infor-
mation such as private Internet records has led to complex and generally secret
new relationships between the military, the intelligence community, and private
companies. As a result, more and more private actors are in possession of gov-
ernment "secrets," increasing the number of cases with no surface connection to
national security in which private actors might nonetheless have to disclose clas-
sified information in the course of routine litigation." Thus, Donohue found that
the state secrets privilege has increasingly been invoked by private litigants in
cases relating to "breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and
employment termination . . . [wlrongful death, personal injury, and negli-
gence."38
Donohue also noted the rise of a form of "graymail," in which corporations
that possess sensitive information as a result of government contracts seek to
pressure the government to intervene in private litigation by suggesting that, ab-
sent government invocation of the state secrets doctrine, they may be "forced" to
reveal state secrets in order to defend themselves.3 9 Even when the government
declines to intervene or when courts ultimately reject state secrets claims, the use
Secrets Privilege, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (Apr. io, 2014), https://ccrjus-
tice.org/learn-more/faqs/loo-days%3A-end-abuse-state-secrets-privilege; D.A. Jer-
emy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privi-
lege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2012).
34. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow ofState Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010).
35. Id. at 85.
36. See id. at 90-91.
37. Thus, an employment-discrimination case against a private contractor might re-
quire disclosure of the existence and nature of a classified program operated in sup-
port of the government, for instance. See Anjetta McQueen, Security Blanket: The
State Secrets Privilege Threat to Public Employment Rights, 22 LAB. LAW. 329, 335
(2007).
38. Donohue, supra note 34, at 87-88; see McQueen, supra note 37, at 335.




of the state secrets doctrine as a litigation tool can delay cases or force their re-
moval to federal courts, severely disadvantaging undercapitalized plaintiffs.
III. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
The state secrets doctrine is not the only way in which the protection of secret
information can have a distorting effect on "ordinary" law. In the context of
criminal prosecutions, parallel dangers are raised by the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA). Under Section 4 of CIPA, the government can make an
in camera, ex parte submission to the court to request authorization "to delete
specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to
the defendant through discovery... ,to substitute a summary of the information
for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting the relevant
facts that classified information would tend to prove." 4o Under Section 6 of CIPA,
the defendant can be excluded from a hearing during which the court "make[s]
all determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified in-
formation that would otherwise be made during the trial."41
CIPA is not new, but in the post-9/11 context it has a newly worrisome im-
pact. Joshua Dratel42 and Ellen Yaroshefskyo4 have argued that the government
has recently been classifying (most critics would say over-classifying) documents
at an unprecedented pace." Further, as noted above, an ever-growing number of
private companies have become involved in the production and use of classified
information.45 As the sheer quantity and range of classified information increases,
they note, we can expect an increase in the number of ordinary criminal cases
that touch upon classified national security information in a purely ancillary way,
40. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2012).
41. See id. § 6(a).
42. Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing
Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041 (2007).
43. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and
FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2006).
44. See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T DEF., DODIG-2013-142, DOD EVALUATION OF
OVER-CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (2013), http://
www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-142.pdf; see also Nick Schwellen-
bach, Could Secrecy Caps Reduce Over Classification?, CTR. EFFECTIVE GOv'T (Aug.
5, 2013), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/could-secrecy-caps-reduce-over-
classification.
45. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/
top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world- growing-beyond- control ("Some 1,271
government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related
to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about io,ooo locations
across the United States .... An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many
people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances.").
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thus also increasing the number of cases in which CIPA can be invoked by the
government.
CIPA was originally intended to prevent criminal defendants who had prior
access to classified information from using discovery procedures to graymail the
government into dropping or reducing charges. But CIPA is also applicable in
criminal prosecutions in which the defendant has no access to classified docu-
ments, but believes that classified documents exist that might be important in his
or her defense case. In such contexts, the in camera and ex parte hearings permit-
ted under CIPA can be extremely damaging to defendants. Redacted or summa-
rized classified documents may lose context, texture, and detail that might be
important to the defense, and judges may have little ability to evaluate whether
classified information submitted ex parte would help the defendant and should
be made discoverable.46
"The impact of secret evidence upon the adversary system has yet to be
acknowledged," argues Yaroshefsky, "in large measure because of the unstated
belief that [CIPA is] confined to a narrow range of terrorism cases."4' But, she
asserts, "secret evidence is seeping into the criminal justice system" as a result of
over-classification, the growing number of individuals and companies involved
in classified activities, and the tendency of prosecutors to "overcharge" ordinary
crimes under anti-terrorism statutes.48
As Yaroshefsky also notes, the "internationalization of crime and law en-
forcement" also increases the likelihood that information relevant to a U.S. crim-
inal case will draw upon classified sources or methods.49 As more crime crosses
international borders-for instance, drug crime, financial crime, Internet-related
crime, and trafficking- and prostitution-related crime-U.S. domestic law en-
forcement officials are increasingly seeking the assistance of the intelligence com-
munity to gain information about foreign activities linked to U.S. criminal inves-
tigations. However, such information may come from sensitive relationships
with foreign intelligence services or assets, or from classified intelligence collec-
tion methods. As a result, many domestic criminal prosecutions are increasingly
intertwined with classified programs. This, in turn, can lead to the increased gov-
ernment invocation of CIPA in criminal cases that are themselves unrelated to
national security, with the ultimate effect of depriving defendants of access to
vital information.50
46. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 43, at 1070-72.
47. Id. at 1o80.
48. Id. at io8l, 1082. Yaroshefsky also notes "a growing concern that CIPA is being used
as a back door means for the government to withhold information otherwise sub-
ject to discovery under Rule 16." Id. at 1072.
49. Id. at 1082.




IV. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
Since 9/11, U.S. immigration law and policy have become deeply bound up
with counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 attackers were all foreigners, and the ap-
parent ease with which they entered the United States raised obvious questions
about the adequacy of U.S. border-control methods and screening programs. Af-
ter 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was relocated into the newly
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and reorganized; most of its
responsibilities shifted to DHS's new Immigration and Customs Enforcement di-
vision (ICE).5' The name change signaled a shift away from a "service" model to
an "enforcement" model.
There has been an enormous post-9/u1 increase in funding for immigration
programs with connections to homeland security.52 In particular, as a 2011 Mi-
gration Policy Institute report documents, 3 the post-9/n1 era has given rise to "a
new generation of interoperable databases and systems that sit at the crossroads
of intelligence and law enforcement, reshaping immigration enforce-
ment ... through increased information collection and sharing." 4
The original purpose of this extensive data collection-including the collec-
tion of biometric data-was the desire to identify those with connections to al-
Qaeda and prevent additional terrorist attacks. Numerous U.S. government or-
ganizations gather information on resident aliens and foreigners seeking entry
into the United States at airports and land borders. At least in theory, the ability
to cross-check such information with information gathered by intelligence and
law enforcement agencies can enable U.S. officials to prevent potential terrorist
plotters from gaining entry into the United States and trace connections between
foreign nationals already inside the United States and foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.
Even though only a tiny fraction of immigrants and foreign visitors have any
nexus to terrorism, such extensive data collection and information sharing has
become the norm for all immigrant groups and most foreign travelers to the
United States. This has costs. For example, it has led to substantial post-9/11
growth in the number of annual immigrant detentions and deportations. Infor-
mation sharing between law enforcement and immigration officials has increased
51. MICHELLE MITrELSTADT ET AL., MIGRATION POL'Y INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF
NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE
DECADE SINCE 9/11, at io (2011).
52. See id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2. US-VISIT collects fingerprints and photographs for all noncitizens entering
the country and stores them in the IDENT database, which is interoperable with
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), authorized by the 1996 reforms,
permits the tracking of international students. Other databases abound. Id. at 5.
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the number of immigrants identified as deportable due to involvement in crimi-
nal activities (though the crimes involved are often exceedingly minor)." Infor-
mation sharing between intelligence agencies and ICE has also led to increased
scrutiny of immigrants from particular countries, ethnic groups, and religious
backgrounds, leading to unequal enforcement of immigration laws.56
It is impossible to say for sure whether these changes have reduced the risk
of terrorism. What does seem clear, however, is that they have made individual
immigrants and foreign nationals far more vulnerable to various forms of sur-
veillance, detention, and removal.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In June 2010, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a pro-
vision of the USA PATRIOT Act that criminalized the provision of material sup-
port or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations. 57 The statute de-
fined material support broadly, to include "any property, tangible or intangible,
or service, . . . training, expert advice or assistance, . . . communications equip-
ment [or] facilities."58 It was challenged by the Humanitarian Law Project, which
argued that the statute's language was impermissibly vague, and could be con-
strued to criminalize its own efforts to marshal expert legal and policy arguments
for the purpose of persuading the Kurdistan Workers' Party (which the Secretary
of State had designated as a "foreign terrorist organization") to refrain from vio-
lence and pursue its political goals through peaceful means. 59 The Humanitarian
Law Project argued that the statute criminalized mere speech.
The Court agreed that the statute might have the effect of criminalizing mere
speech, and that strict scrutiny should therefore apply. Traditionally, strict scru-
tiny requires the government to show that restrictions on individual constitu-
tional rights are necessary and "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling gov-
ernment interest.o In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that
55. See Paige Scheckla, Personal Security for Citizens and Non-Citizens in Post-9/1 US
Immigration Policy, UNIV. CHI. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC (Nov. 19, 2013), https://
ihrclinic.uchicago.edulblog/personal-security-citizens-and-non-citizens-post-911
-us-immigration-policy-paige-scheckla-il; see also SAMANTHA HAUPTMAN, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION: THE POST 9/11 MORAL PANIC (2013).
56. Deepa Iyer & Jayesh M. Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation of U.S. Immigration
Law and Policy, 38 HuM. RTs. MAG., Winter 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/human-rightsmagazine-home/human-rights-vo138_2011/human
rights-winter20ll/9-nl-transformation of-usimmigration_1aw-policy.html.
57. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
59. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 9.
60. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,198 (1992) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Air-
port Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP




the prevention of terrorism constituted a compelling government interest-and
rendered the requirement that the restriction on First Amendment rights be nec-
essary and narrowly tailored almost meaningless by deferring to government as-
sertions that the type of speech contemplated by the Humanitarian Law Project
would interfere with government terrorism prevention efforts."
As David Cole has noted, the case was not decided on national security
grounds as such, but as a question of general constitutional law." This raises
troubling questions about "the decision's potential consequences for First
Amendment doctrine more generally." Cole comments:
For the first time in its history, the Court upheld the criminalization of
speech advocating only nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that such
speech might unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdo-
ing . . .. The Court treated a viewpoint-based motive for suppressing
speech not as grounds for invalidation, but as a justification for the law.
And the Court reduced the right of association to an empty formalism,
allowing the government to prohibit, under the rubric of "material sup-
port," virtually any concrete manifestation of association-such as pay-
ing dues, donating funds, volunteering one's time or services, or work-
ing together toward common ends, no matter how lawful.63
Here, the existence of trickle-down is much more speculative. Though the
Court's decision in Humanitarian Law Project was clearly influenced by the coun-
terterrorism context of the statute, the Court's holding could have significant
consequences far beyond the counterterrorism context. In Humanitarian Law
Project, "strict scrutiny" looked more like rational basis review-a highly defer-
ential standard of review. As Cole notes, this raises troubling questions about the
future of First Amendment rights: "[c]ould training in nonviolent mediation [for
gang members] be prohibited on the ground that it might 'legitimate' the gang,"
he asks, "thereby making it more attractive to new members who might commit
future crimes? Could peaceable environmental advocacy coordinated with
Greenpeace be banned because the organization sometimes engages in illegal
trespass or property damage as civil disobedience?"6 4
It is too soon to determine the impact of Humanitarian Law Project. Perhaps
courts will find ways to limit its impact. For example, in Al Haramain Islamic
U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
61. See David Cole, The First Amendment's Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitar-
ian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 148, 158
(2012).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 149.
64. Id. at 157.
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Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury," the Ninth Circuit read Hu-
manitarian Law Project narrowly. 6 6 But there is already some evidence that the
material support statute and similar provisions have had a chilling effect on civil-
society organizations. A 2007 report published by the International NGO Train-
ing and Research Centre (INTRAC) notes that "[i]n the absence of clear, sensible
guidance and information from government about ... what is legally required,
confusion and fear are driving the response of the nonprofit sector in the cam-
paign against terror."7 Tim Morris writes:
[i]n recent decades the best practice trend in aid has been for northern
NGOs to move away from service provision and to partner with local
NGOs who actually do the work. However, in the current climate the
risk of partner selection is so great and demands from the government
so onerous that many U.S. agencies find that being a service provider is
safer. 8
VI. PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE
The war on terror has also led the U.S. government to dramatically step up
its efforts to collect and analyze a wide range of information, from cell phone
metadata and Internet communications to biometric data. Meanwhile, techno-
logical advances have enabled the more effective analysis of information gathered
through various forms of surveillance. Surveillance imagery can now be subjected
to facial-recognition analysis, for instance, enabling an unprecedented degree of
tracking. Given one photograph of an individual, facial-recognition software can
sift through countless other images-whether provided by government surveil-
lance cameras or posted by acquaintances on social media sites-to find
matches. 9
In the national-security context, recent technological leaps in surveillance
and analysis capabilities have also enabled a recent shift towards identifying and
targeting "enemy combatants" who have been identified as such purely by pat-
65. 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012).
66. Id. at 995-1oo. The Ninth Circuit held that, while strict scrutiny might be satisfied
in the specific factual context at issue in Humanitarian Law Project, it could not be
satisfied with regard to government efforts to ban speech coordinated with a do-
mestic affiliate of a foreign terrorist organization under circumstances rendering it
unlikely that the speech at issue would interfere with the government's compelling
interest of preventing terrorism.
67. Tim Morris, The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society, INT'L NGO
TRAINING & RESEARCH CTR. 3 (2010), http://www.timmorris.info/cairo%20CTM
%20presentation.pdf.
68. Id. at 4.
69. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss:




tern analysis, with no specific information linking identifiable individuals to hos-
tile activities. This has led to an increase in so-called "signature strikes": drone
strikes against unidentified people presumed to be targetable enemies because of
their communications patterns, travel patterns, and so on.70
Domestically, fears of trickle-down seem well founded. The post-9/u1 USA
PATRIOT Act effectively eliminated the pre-9/11 firewall between foreign intelli-
gence gathering and domestic law enforcement, permitting intelligence agencies
to engage in the surveillance of U.S. citizens believed to be agents of a foreign
power, as long as the gathering of foreign intelligence is a "significant" purpose
of the surveillance. The PATRIOT Act also permits federal law enforcement of-
ficials to access a wide range of sensitive information (including Internet records,
telephone metadata, library records, and credit and banking information of U.S.
citizens) upon successful application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. Law enforcement officials need not show probable cause, however; they
need only show that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."72
It is easy to imagine information gained in this manner being "repurposed"
by law enforcement officials. Even if such information cannot be used in criminal
prosecutions, embarrassing information gleaned through data collection and
surveillance might be used in other ways by law enforcement officials-for in-
stance, to put pressure on potential witnesses or informants.3 Similarly, the so-
phisticated pattern-recognition technologies originally developed for military
70. See David S. Cloud, CIA Drones Have Broader List of Targets, L.A. TIMES,
May 5, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/maylo5/world/la-fg-drone-targets
-20100506; see also Cora Currier & Justin Elliott, The Drone War Doctrine We Still
Know Nothing About, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/
article/drone-war- doctrine-we-know-nothing-about.
71. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 1804 et seq.). Previously, foreign intelligence gathering had to be a "pri-
mary" purpose. See Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 409 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264 (2004).
72. USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (emphasis
added). The court conducts an in camera review, and issues ex parte approval or-
ders. The National Security Agency's program to collect telephone metadata on
U.S. citizens was approved under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. See Report on
the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. (2014), http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/de-
fault/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf.
73. See Timothy B. Lee, Here's How Phone Metadata Can Reveal Your Affairs, Abortions,
and Other Secrets, THE SWITCH (WASH. POST), Aug. 27, 2013 (11:12 AM), http://
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and intelligence purposes can also easily be used by domestic law enforcement
officials in ways that do not require extensive new data collection or surveillance,
but that nonetheless shift away from individualized determinations in a manner
that raises troubling constitutional questions.74
Beyond this, widespread surveillance and government access to personal data
can have obvious chilling effects on the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. Consider, for instance, the impact on journalists, who must rely heavily
on information provided confidentially by sources." "Some of our longtime
trusted sources have become nervous and anxious about talking to us, even on
stories that aren't about national security," Associated Press President Gary
Pruitt noted in a 2013 speech.76 "And, in some cases, government employees that
we once checked in with regularly will no longer speak to us by phone, and some
are reluctant to meet in person."" Pruitt adds that
[t]his chilling effect is not just at AP, it's happening at other news organ-
izations as well. Journalists from other news organizations have person-
ally told me it has intimidated sources from speaking to them. Now, the
government may love this. I suspect they do. But beware the government
that loves secrecy too much78
CONCLUSION
In this brief Essay, I have focused on policing, the state secrets privilege in
civil litigation, classified information in criminal litigation, immigration, First
Amendment jurisprudence, and surveillance issues for the simple reason that
these are the areas in which I was able to find the largest amount of information
suggesting a potential spillover of war into ordinary law and law enforcement.
However, many other areas call out for additional research.
For instance, one might wish to look more broadly at various forms of judi-
cial deference to the executive, to see if the patterns of deference emerging from
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2o13/o8/27/heres-how-phone
-metadata-can- reveal-your- affairs-abortions- and-other-secrets.
74. Imagine, for instance, the use of pattern- recognition technologies to identify, in-
vestigate and potentially entrap users of prohibited drugs. See Marc Jonathan Blitz,
Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amend-
ment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (2004).
75. See Emily Bell et al., Comment to Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies Regarding the Effects of Mass Surveillance on the Practice of Journalism
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Letter-Effect-of
-mass-surveillance-on-journalism.pdf.
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national-security-related cases are correlated with an increase in deference in
other kinds of cases. Stephen Vladeck has already done some valuable work in
this and related areas, looking at the political question doctrine, the availability
of Bivens remedies, federal common law defenses to state-law suits against gov-
ernment contractors, and qualified immunity. Ultimately, he notes:
[As] "national security"-based exceptions increasingly become the rule
in contemporary civil litigation against government officers-whether
with regard to new 'special factors' under Bivens, new bases for contrac-
tor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political question doc-
trine, or even more expansive reliance upon the qualified immunity de-
fense-the line between the unique national security justifications giving
rise to these cases and ordinary civil litigation will increasingly blur. 9
It would also be valuable to explore the enduring impact of 9/n1 on principles
of government transparency. After 9/11, many once-public government docu-
ments (such as those relating to public water management supply systems,"o blue-
prints of government buildings, and so on) ceased to be public due to fears that
these documents might make it easier for terrorists to plan attacks. But the re-
moval of such documents from the public domain also reduces government
transparency."' Has the post-9/11 trend towards limiting publicly available infor-
mation continued? Has it spread?
One might also look at whether the increased use of ex parte and in camera
proceedings in cases touching upon classified information is correlated with a
greater judicial willingness to permit ex parte proceedings in other contexts not
involving classified information. On a different issue, one might seek to deter-
mine whether U.S. government efforts to redefine "imminence" in the interna-
tional self-defense context are correlated with similar efforts to reconceptualize
imminence in domestic self-defense contexts. (The Bush Administration's doc-
trine of preemptive self-defense-more or less carried on by the Obama Admin-
istration via its changed understanding of imminence-parallels the logic of do-
mestic "stand-your-ground" laws.)
I could go on, but, in general, I share Vladeck's suspicion that, "[f]or better
or worse, one can find national security considerations influencing ordinary ju-
dicial decision making across almost the entire gamut of contemporary civil and
79. Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1330.
8o. R.I. Affiliate, The Legacy of the Indefinite "War on Terror" in Rhode Island: Civil Lib-
erties in the Aftermath of 9/11, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 14 (2011), http://
riaclu.org/images/uploads/WaronTerrorinRhodelslandReport.pdf.
81. See Doherty et al., supra note 17; Doherty et al., supra note 18.
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criminal litigation."" To this, I would only add that national security considera-
tions have likely also seeped into law enforcement practices,3 immigration poli-
cies, and a range of other non-judicial activities.
As I noted at the beginning of this Essay, trickle-down effects are inherently
difficult to discern and measure, and it is also extraordinarily difficult to deter-
mine causation. Perhaps 9/11 merely accelerated pre-existing trends; perhaps it
had no causal impact at all. Perhaps some or all of the trends hinted at above
would have emerged with or without 9/11 and the war-making that followed.4
But these difficulties do not make the project of seeking to identify trickle-down
effects less important.
This short Essay only scratches the surface. Nonetheless, my hope is that it
will inspire additional efforts to map the trickle-down effects of the war on terror
in a more comprehensive manner, challenging as that task may be. So far, most
efforts to examine the spillover of post-9/11 doctrines and practices into ordinary
law and law enforcement have been piecemeal and ad hoc. But thirteen years after
9/11, we may now be able to look at the phenomena more comprehensively. Given
the close historical relationship between war-making and state transformation,
can we afford not to?
82. Vladeck, Foreword, supra note 19, at 288.
83. Tellingly, for instance, the USA PATRIOT Act's authorization of delayed-notice
search warrants (permitting so-called "sneak and peek" searches) was motivated by
counterterrorism concerns, but studies suggest that less than one percent of de-
layed-notice warrant cases have actually involved terrorism. The rest have involved
ordinary crimes; 75 percent of delayed-notice warrants are used in drug cases. See
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth
Amendment 'Rule Requiring Notice,' 41 PEPP. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 2226977-
84. As Vladeck notes in The New National Security Canon, for instance, "the Rehnquist
and Roberts courts have systematically made it more difficult for civil plaintiffs to
obtain damages in cases arising out of governmental misconduct." Vladeck, supra
note 14, at 1297; see also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that increased government surveillance is
driven by accelerating developments in information technology, and that the war
on terror is not its sole or most important cause); Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of
National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573 (2011) (charting the timelines of na-
tional-security-discourse- driven laws and suggesting that 9/n likely just accelerated
the expansion of state power vis-h-vis individuals); Parry, supra note 31, at 834-35.
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